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IS LAW?
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS AND
EXISTENTIAL ANXIETY
Alice Ristroph*
To ask, "Is God?" appears to presuppose a being who perhaps isn't.. .and thus
is open to the same objection as the question, "Does God exist?".. .but until
the difficulty is pointed out it does not have the same propensity to confuse
language with meaning and to conjure up a God who may have any number of
predicates including omniscience, perfection and four-wheel-drive but not, as it
happens, existence.
- Tom Stoppard, Jumpers'
[W]hereas the allotment of proper names rests only on an ad hoc convention,
the extension of the general terms of any serious discipline is never without its
principle or rationale .... When [it is asked], "We know that it is called law,
but is it really law?", what is demanded-no doubt obscurely-is that the prin-
ciple be made explicit and its credentials inspected.
- H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law2
INTRODUCTION
Scholars have raised (at least) two distinct specters of crisis
in American constitutional law. The first is a potential crisis of
doctrine: specifically, the worry is that constitutional doctrine
has ceased to look like law. The doctrine is in disarray; one case
contradicts another and some cases even contradict themselves.
Of course, doctrinal muddles are nothing new, but now the mess
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. The initial
version of this essay was prepared for presentation at a panel entitled "Is American Con-
stitutional Law in Crisis?" at the January 2009 meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools. For helpful comments, thanks to Thomas Healy, Jameel Jaffer, Kwasi
Prempeh, Nicholas Rosenkranz, Michael Seidman, and participants at the 2009 AALS
panel, the Seton Hall Law School Faculty Retreat, and the Georgetown Constitutional
Law Colloquium.
1. TOM STOPPARD, JUMPERS 24 (1972).
2. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 210 (1961).
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is so bad that one of the country's leading constitutional scholars
does not think it is possible to clean it up.
A second concept of crisis focuses not on doctrine per se,
but on the actions of institutions and officials within American
government. Here, constitutional scholars have been interested
in moments at which the Constitution fails to do what it is os-
tensibly designed to do: resolve disagreements, including disa-
greements between government institutions about their respec-
tive powers, without violence in order to ensure the possibility of
"ordinary" politics. 4 On this account of crisis, the focus is less on
judicial decisions than on the constitutional system itself. The
worry is that the constitutional order is in crisis; it has reached a
precarious spot from which it may change radically or topple al-
together.5
These are two different accounts of crisis, each explored in
more detail below, but the two accounts are related in that each
implies profound constitutional disagreement.6 Doctrinal crisis
results when the official interpreters of the Constitution cannot
agree on what it means, and when the interpreters' disagreement
is so great that their interpreters -including scholars, lawyers,
and lower court judges-cannot make sense of the doctrine. In-
stitutional or systemic crisis results when the actors within the
constitutional system disagree about their roles and authority
and are willing to go to the mat to defend their competing inter-
pretations.
3. See Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 291 (2005).
4. A contrast between "ordinary" politics and extraordinary moments is central to
recent scholarship on constitutional crisis, and to the related concepts of "constitutional
hardball" and "constitutional showdowns." See, e.g., Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin,
Constitutional Crises, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 707, 710-11, 714 (2009); Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991 (2008); Mark
Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 523, 531-32 (2004) ("The
term ordinary signals what we need to distinguish constitutional hardball."); Keith E.
Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093, 2096-99
(2002). Although Tushnet explicitly refers to Bruce Ackerman's distinction between or-
dinary politics and extraordinary moments of "higher" lawmaking, it does not seem to
me that the ordinary/extraordinary line in these accounts of crisis corresponds to Acker-
man's distinction. For further discussion, see infra note 32.
5. I use "constitutional order" as the term was introduced by Mark Tushnet-to
describe "the set of institutions through which a nation makes its fundamental decisions
over a sustained period, and the principles which guide those decisions." Mark Tushnet,
Foreword: The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration,
113 HARV. L REV. 29, 31 (1999).
6. On Levinson and Balkin's account, only a subset of constitutional crises-those
they term "Type Three crises" - necessarily involve disagreement over the meaning of
the Constitution. But Type Three crises appear to be the only ones that occur with any
regularity. See Levinson & Balkin, supra note 4, at 738-40.
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If the talk of crisis stems from the presence of profound dis-
agreement, we should ask whether there is something distinctive
about contemporary constitutional disagreement. Stark disputes
over both doctrine and the scope of institutional power under
the Constitution have occurred at many points in American his-
tory. If American constitutional law is in crisis now, it has been
for a long time -perhaps since its inception. And if the notion of
permanent crisis seems oxymoronic, it may be that "crisis" is not
a very useful concept in the field of constitutional law.
Whether the concept of crisis is useful to American consti-
tutional law or not, the rhetoric of crisis has surfaced often in re-
cent years. The second part of this essay explores possible rea-
sons for this rhetoric. It could just be that crisis talk sells papers
(or places articles), and it should be noted that several academic
commentators have raised the specter of crisis only to dismiss it.7
Still, even if these commentators agree that the talk of crisis is a
false alarm, what led anyone to raise this alarm now?
In the fact that the alarm has been raised, and even in the
manner of its dismissal, we may find key insights into to contem-
porary American political and legal thought. In particular, in the
discourses of crisis one may find traces of three forms of existen-
tial anxiety. The first, and most fleeting, is an anxiety about the
continued existence of the nation itself. Such anxiety may have
surfaced briefly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and we
still sometimes hear the rhetoric of existential crisis. Today,
however, that rhetoric appears to be strategically deployed to
defend preferred political outcomes; it does not seem that a ge-
nuine fear of imminent destruction survives on any large scale.
All the same, it is worth considering the status of law in the face
of threats to a nation's (or person's) survival.
A second form of existential anxiety-to my mind, the most
interesting form-is an anxiety about the possibility of the rule
of law itself. This anxiety might be the Pyrrhic victory of legal
realism and its offspring, the critical legal studies movement.
Though the CLS movement is now, in the words of one of its
7. At the January 2009 AALS panel for which the first draft of this paper was pre-
pared, each panelist answered the titular question ("Is American Constitutional Law in
Crisis?") in the negative. See also Michael J. Gerhardt, Crisis and Constitutionalism, 63
MONT. L. REv. 277, 277-81 (2002) (claiming constitutional law professors "live for cris-
es" and "make [their] living[s] writing and talking about them," but then arguing that
none of the recent developments labeled "crisis" actually was a crisis); Levinson & Bal-
kin, supra note 4; Whittington, supra note 4.
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founders, "dead, dead, dead," 8 the more modest versions of real-
ist claims about legal indeterminancy and the relation of law and
politics are widely accepted in the academy. 9 As a consequence,
it is increasingly difficult to develop legal, and intellectually hon-
est, critiques of the actions of those who hold political power.
And yet critiquing those in power is something that many mem-
bers of the legal academy very much want to do. Hence, crisis.
Third, and most solipsistically, references to crisis in consti-
tutional law scholarship could be produced by a kind of profes-
sional anxiety in the legal academy. Though I don't know if any-
one in the academy will admit to this, we may be asking
ourselves, "Constitutional theory: what is it good for?" and wor-
rying that the answer is, "Absolutely nothing."10 If we are not
asking ourselves this question, we should be. Existential anxiety
is not necessarily a bad thing. Indeed, it might be a moral re-
sponsibility.
In speaking of existential anxiety, I rely on two related but
distinct usages of the word existential. In the simpler usage, exis-
tential can refer to the mere fact of existence. For example, ref-
erences to "existential threats" to a nation typically conjure its
potential destruction. A somewhat different usage invokes exis-
tentialism, a philosophical approach associated with thinkers
such as Sartre and Camus, and is concerned less with the fact
and more with the meaning of human existence.' As will be-
come clear, contemporary discussions of constitutional crisis
prompt questions of both the fact and the meaning of existence.
We worry whether law exists, and we worry about the signific-
ance of what we do as lawyers, as legal academics, and as citi-
zens of a constitutional democracy. In some cases, the worries
may be silly handwringing, born of an overblown sense of self-
8. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellec-
tual History, 90 GEO. L.J. 113, 113 (2001) (attributing the claim that CLS is "dead, dead,
dead" to Duncan Kennedy).
9. As first put almost 25 years ago, and reiterated much more recently, "we are all
[legal] realists now." Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1151, 1152 (1985); see also Michael C. Dorf, After Bureaucracy, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245,
1249 (2004) (quoting Peller). Of course, the indeterminancy widely acknowledged by law
professors is regularly-and unconvincingly-denied in judicial nomination hearings.
10. Perhaps Pierre Schlag is finally getting under the skin of the legal academy. See,
e.g., Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Hap-
pening (A Report on the State of the Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803 (2009); Pierre Schlag, Law and
Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to
Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990).
11. See WALTER KAUFMANN, EXISTENTIALISM FROM DOSTOEVSKY TO SARTRE
(1968).
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importance. But the worries may also reveal deep and worth-
while questions about the nature and function of law.
I. NOTHING NEW UNDER THE SUN?
A. DOCTRINAL "CRISIS"
We hear whispers of a crisis, or a crisis that might be. What
would produce such claims with respect to American constitu-
tional law? There is no shortage of American constitutional deci-
sions-the Supreme Court and lower federal courts continue to
hear cases and announce outcomes. And each decision comes
accompanied by reasons, a written opinion that explains the re-
levant constitutional provisions, gives some account of prior de-
cisions in the area, and purports to apply principle to fact to
reach an outcome. The institutions remain in place, more or less.
The Constitution has not been burnt, the U.S. Reports have not
been lost, the courthouses are still open, and the bench is still
peopled with men and women who seem to understand them-
selves as jurists and their activity as the application of law.
Whence the talk of crisis?
The specter of crisis is not produced by a change in the
number or even the basic form of constitutional decisions. Ra-
ther, the worry arises among those who believe that law, proper-
ly so called, is something more than a collection of decisions.
The worry arises among those who try to reconcile each new de-
cision with prior cases in the same area, and especially among
those whose reconciliation efforts are by necessity more com-
prehensive than the Supreme Court's own discussions of
precedent. I speak of academics and, to a lesser but still signifi-
cant extent, lower federal court judges. Members of these groups
are increasingly critical of the Supreme Court for its seemingly
contradictory opinions and for its lack of clarity on many central
questions of constitutional law. With respect to the establish-
ment clause, free exercise, equal protection, the commerce
clause, and still other constitutional provisions, the Court has (it
is charged) created a mess that leaves lower court judges and law
professors increasingly uncertain about their ability to give a
positive, descriptive account of what the law is.12
12. In the contexts of the First Amendment, equal protection, due process, and the
commerce clause, doctrinal disorder is widely noted and well documented. In a context
2009]
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Among legal academics, one of the most widely publicized
indictments of constitutional doctrine came in April 2005, when
Laurence Tribe announced that he was suspending work on the
second volume of his constitutional law treatise for the foreseea-
ble future. Tribe explained that "conflict over basic constitution-
al premises" had reached a "fever pitch," and as a consequence,
this was (is) a "peculiarly bad time.., to propound a Grand
Unified Theory-or anything close."' 3 According to Tribe, "we
find ourselves at a juncture where profound fault lines have be-
come evident at the very foundations of the enterprise, going to
issues as fundamental as whose truths are to count and, sadly,
whose truths must be denied., 14 In particular, Tribe emphasized
the fault lines around constitutional issues of literal life and
death-the "deep and thus far intractable divisions" over ques-
tions such as whether the Constitution protects rights to abortion
or assisted suicide. 5 These divisions "between wholly different
ways of assessing truth and experiencing reality.., have become
too plain-and too pronounced-to paper over by routine ap-
peals" to constitutional procedures, the separation of powers,
and methods of interpretation.' 6 Tribe's account is one of crisis
in the ordinary sense of that word-a critical moment of instabil-
ity, a time when the continued existence of law-as-we-know-it is
at stake.
Tribe is right to identify disputes over issues such as abor-
tion and assisted suicide as the result of profound disagreements
over what counts as truth. The question, though, is whether the
fact of deep disagreement is new, whether the early twenty-first
century is in fact a peculiarly bad time to attempt a grand theory
of constitutional law. After all, the decision that Tribe labels
(probably accurately) most controversial-Roe v. Wade' 7V-is
hardly a recent one. And though Tribe claims that the fissures
less often scrutinized by constitutional law scholars, consider then-Judge Michael
McConnell's frustration with the Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment sentencing
decisions:
The Booker opinions, taken in tandem, do not get high marks for consistency or
coherence. If that seems a presumptuous thing for an inferior court judge to say
about the product of his superiors, I take comfort in the fact that eight of the
nine Justices agree with me that [at least one of two prongs of the Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence] is wrong, and the two do not fit together.
Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENY. U. L. REV. 665,677 (2006).
13. Tribe, supra note 3, at 292-93 (emphasis in original).
14. Id. at 295.
15. Id. at 302.
16. Id.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Roe opened have only recently become sufficiently "prominent
as to preclude unified treatment," he acknowledges that in 1973,
the year Roe was decided, John Hart Ely denied that the deci-
sion was "constitutional law" at all.' 8 The Supreme Court's as-
sisted suicide decisions are somewhat more recent, but the deep
normative and epistemological disagreements found in the pub-
lic reactions to Washington v. Glucksberg'9 and Vacco v. Quill20
were also present several years earlier in the reactions to Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.2' Such disagree-
ments relate to the nature of the questions at stake in those deci-
sions, not to a particular historical moment. If Tribe had looked
for evidence of constitutional disagreements that reflect "differ-
ent ways of experiencing reality," he could have found it long be-
fore 2005.22 Indeed, Tribe's image of contested truths recalls Ro-
bert Cover's "Nomos and Narrative ,23- and Cover published his
account of fundamental legal disagreements, polynomia, and
"jurispathic" courts more than 20 years before Tribe diagnosed
the present crisis. Already in 1983, Cover did not understand
himself to be diagnosing a new condition; nineteenth century
"antislavery constitutionalism" was one of his central examples
of alternative legal understandings.24
As Tribe is unquestionably aware, the appearance of doc-
trinal disorder is not itself new. For as long as there have been
professors of American constitutional law, there have been scho-
larly efforts to identify doctrinal inconsistencies and then to re-
concile them. Rather, Tribe's abandonment of his treatise seems
to reflect a newly developed suspicion that there is no order ob-
scured by the disorder. If this suspicion is correct, doctrinal in-
consistencies cannot be resolved by returning to constitutional
text or restatements of constitutional principles. If the suspicion
is correct, constitutional disagreement goes all the way down,
18. Id. at 296; see John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 947
(1973) (arguing that Roe v. Wade "is not constitutional law and gives almost no sense of
an obligation to try to be").
19. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
20. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
21. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
22. "To maintain its credibility, the law must accurately reflect the reality it pur-
ports to govern. Measured by this standard, the Court's recent 'right to die' decision,
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, was an abysmal failure." Tom Stacy,
Death, Privacy, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 491, 491 (1992).
23. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983); see Tribe,
supra note 3, at 300 n.1.
24. Cover, supra note 23, at 35-40.
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and there is no distinctively legal way to resolve those disagree-
ments. Maybe our constitutional faith has begun to falter.26
Maybe the crisis is an existential one-a deep anxiety that we
are not tied to the mast after all, that we never were so tied, that
constitutional law, qua law, doesn't even exist.
I explore this possibility further in Part II; for now I note
only that it too is not really new: for decades, strands of legal
scholarship have emphasized the indeterminancy of legal rules
and corresponding doctrinal incoherence, and many scholars
have made related claims about the inseparability of law and
politics. 27 Conceptually, indeterminancy and disagreement are
separate issues, but one always makes the other more evident. It
may be true that constitutional rules are presently too indeter-
minate to settle political disagreements, but this situation is not
new. There has long been widespread acceptance of the view
that constitutional decisions are at least underdetermined. 28 In-
deed, the cries of "doctrinal chaos" might even appear somewhat
disingenuous, coming from an academy that has for years largely
rejected legal formalism and emphasized the political, contingent
nature of many legal decisions. Has not the role of law profes-
sors always been to digest what the judge ate for breakfast?
Maybe the new crisis is not the discovery of indeterminancy, but
the academy's indigestion.
B. INSTITUTIONAL OR SYSTEMIC "CRISIS"
Distinct from (but related to) the concern about doctrinal
chaos, a second discourse of constitutional crisis looks beyond
judicial opinions to institutions in all branches of government.
Several leading scholars have recently considered failures or
near-failures of the constitutional system in terms of "constitu-
tional crisis," "constitutional hardball," or "constitutional show-
downs." For the most part, the scholars have rejected the possi-
25. See Tribe, supra note 3, at 304-05.
26. Cf. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988).
27. For a few of the classic arguments in this vein from legal realists, see Felix Co-
hen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809
(1935); Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
28. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminancy Crisis: Critiquing Legal
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 494-95 (1987); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules
Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781
(1983). As Tribe put it, the earlier editions of his treatise did not assume constitutional
determinancy, but only "determinate indeterminancy." "There were no provably right
answers.., but there were clearly wrong ones." Tribe, supra note 3, at 303.
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bility that we are now at a point of constitutional failure-so
even if we think of crisis in systemic or institutional terms, it
does not seem that the concept of crisis distinguishes our present
moment.
Defining a constitutional crisis proves a bit tricky. If we spe-
cify the concept narrowly enough, real-world examples become
few and far between. Keith Whittington has identified two types
of constitutional crisis: the crisis of operation, "when important
political disputes cannot be resolved within the existing constitu-
tional framework,"2 9 and the crisis of fidelity, "when important
political actors threaten to become no longer willing to abide by
existing constitutional arrangements," or when they "systemati-
cally contradict constitutional proscriptions.', 30 Depending on
how these definitions are interpreted, nearly everything-or
nearly nothing-might be a constitutional crisis. For example, if
the thesis of constitutional underdeterminancy is correct, if many
or most constitutional disputes cannot be resolved by the Consti-
tution itself, then one could argue that crises of operation hap-
pen very frequently. But Whittington rejects the claim that the
mere appearance of indeterminancy constitutes a crisis: "To the
extent that existing political actors, such as the judiciary, can re-
solve apparent textual contradictions or indeterminancies with-
out appeal to extraordinary measures, then they need not lead to
constitutional crises.,'3 In its invocation of a distinction between
the ordinary and the extraordinary, Whittington's account is
consistent with other recent scholarly accounts of crisis (or re-
lated constitutional instability).32 And once the concept of crisis
is properly limited to moments of extraordinary dispute or infi-
delity, we find that "actual constitutional crises have been ex-
ceedingly rare ... at the national level.
33
To Whittington's categories of operational and fidelity cris-
es, Jack Balkin and Sandy Levinson add a third category: radical
29. Whittington, supra note 4, at 2101.
30. Id. at 2109-10.
31. Id. at 2101 n.29.
32. A somewhat similar distinction between ordinary constitutional decisions (by
government officials) and extraordinary "constitutional moments" (in which a large por-
tion of the populace is involved in constitutional decisionmaking) is developed by Bruce
Ackerman in 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) and 2 WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). Though the terminology is similar, Ackerman's account is
different from the line that Whittington, and other scholars, draw between ordinary and
extraordinary to elucidate constitutional crisis. The "extraordinary" moments that mark
constitutional crises are not characterized by mass participation.
33. Whittington, supra note 4, at 2119.
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disagreement among government actors about their respective
power under the Constitution.34 Here again, the difference be-
tween the ordinary and the extraordinary is key. "The Constitu-
tion is designed to keep political disagreements-including disa-
greements about the Constitution's proper interpretation-
within the bounds of normal politics. In type three crises, the
Constitution fails at this task, and one or more of the parties
moves outside the ordinary boundaries of politics in an effort to
win." 35 More than Whittington, Levinson and Balkin offer guid-
ance on how to distinguish ordinary politics from the extraordi-
nary: "extraordinary" struggles appear to be those that involve
force or violence, those in which people put bodies (their own or
others') on the line. Military force, by national or state forces,
mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, and "taking to the
streets" are all marks of type three crises.36 In a type three crisis,
we see "extraordinary forms of protest beyond mere legal disa-
greements and political protest: people take to the streets, ar-
mies mobilize, and brute force is used or threatened in order to
prevail.
37
The suggestion that politics doesn't ordinarily involve the
use of brute force merits further consideration, but first, note
that the line between the ordinary and the extraordinary also
shapes Mark Tushnet's account of "constitutional hardball" and
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule's account of "constitutional
showdowns." Tushnet describes constitutional hardball as "polit-
ical claims and practices.., that are without much question
within the bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and practice
but that are nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-
constitutional understandings., 38 Constitutional hardball can be
perilous, Tushnet suggests, and we should prefer the "ordinary
34. Levinson & Balkin, supra note 4, at 738. Levinson and Balkin divide their
schema into type one, type two, and type three crises. A type one crisis, in which "politi-
cal leaders publicly claim the right to suspend features of the Constitution in order to
preserve the overall social order," id. at 721, corresponds to Whittington's crisis of fideli-
ty, see id. at 721 n.53. And the type two crisis, which occurs when everyone abides by the
Constitution, but doing so "fails to resolve an existing political crisis or leads to disaster,"
corresponds to Whittington's crisis of operation. See id. at 729 & n.87.
35. Id. at 739.
36. Id. at 741, 746.
37. Id. at 714.
38. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 523. "Pre-constitutional understandings" are those
that "go without saying" and are for that reason "hard to identify outside times of crisis."
Id. at 523 n.2. There is a danger of circularity in this account. Hardball is defined in terms
of challenges to pre-constitutional understandings, but we can identify those pre-
constitutional understandings only when people are playing hardball.
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means of politics. ' 39 Posner and Vermeule describe a "constitu-
tional showdown" as a "disagreement between branches of gov-
ernment over their constitutional powers" that ends in one
branch's acquiescence and creates a precedent. 40 The difference
between the ordinary and the extraordinary is again critical,
though underspecified here. Posner and Vermeule assert (by
"fiat") a distinction between the acquiescence that ends a show-
down and a compromise that avoids one, but they do not elabo-
rate the difference between acquiescence and compromise, and
they acknowledge that "the line between a showdown and ordi-
nary mechanisms of constitutional development is a fine one.",
41
The extreme form of a showdown-when each branch asserts its
power and refuses to acquiesce-is a "full-blown constitutional
crisis" and "[n]o ordinary political or legal means exists for re-
solving the dispute.
42
If these theories of crisis, hardball, and showdowns are to
help us decide whether we are now in a moment of constitution-
al crisis, two observations are in order. First, of the scholars just
discussed, only Tushnet seems to argue that the present moment
is distinctively close to crisis; others suggest that the term "con-
stitutional crisis" is overused (or lament the fact that "constitu-
tional showdowns" don't occur often enough).43 And second, as
already suggested, these recent accounts of crisis, hardball, and
showdown all invoke a distinction between ordinary politics and
extraordinary conflict. To ascertain whether we presently face
constitutional crisis, it seems that we must know how to distin-
guish between politics as usual and politics by other means.
39. Id. at 551. Tushnet refers to Ackerman's distinction between the ordinary and
extraordinary, but he does not seem to draw this distinction in the same manner as Ack-
erman.
40. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at 997.
41. Id. at 998.
42. Id. at 1005.
43. See Tushnet, supra note 4, at 523 (arguing that "there is a sense in which [consti-
tutional hardball] is new"). See also Levinson & Balkin, supra note 4; Whittington, supra
note 4. And Tushnet may be able to make the case that constitutional hardball is distinc-
tive to the present period only by blurring the distinction between "constitutional nor-
malcy" and "constitutional transformation." See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball
and Constitutional Crises, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 579, 597 (2008). Posner and Vermeule
do not directly address the question whether constitutional showdowns are more preva-
lent today, but they do argue that the supply of showdowns is probably less than the "so-
cially optimal rate and distribution of showdowns." Posner & Vermeule, supra note 4, at
1023-38.
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It is war, of course, that is often said to be the continuation
of politics by other means.44 The aphorism often prompts de-
bates about whether war and politics, despite their different
means, aspire to the same goals. But rarely, if ever, do those who
invoke the aphorism specify what distinguishes the means of pol-
itics from the means of war, and almost never do we consider the
possibility that war and politics use the same means. We con-
trast, for example, "political solutions" with military ones. In
common perception, politics as usual-the "ordinary means" of
politics that are contrasted to the extraordinary struggles at
times of crisis-is non-violent. That is certainly consistent with
Levinson and Balkin's emphasis on "brute force" as the distinc-
tive means of constitutional crisis.
Is the use of force really so extraordinary? There is a fasci-
nating literature on the place of violence in domestic politics,
and on the possibilities that war is politics by other means or that
politics is war by other means. 45- I leave aside this literature
here.46 For purposes of diagnosing constitutional crisis, I will say
only that the characterization of ordinary politics as an alterna-
tive to force and violence is a characterization that needs to be
defended. The characterization usually goes unquestioned, but
this is only because most contemporary political thought ex-
44. The one-liner has enjoyed considerably more attention than Clausewitz's actual
argument, which is somewhat opaque. "War is a mere continuation of policy by other
means .... War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a contin-
uation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means." CARL VON
CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 119 (Anatol Rapoport ed., J.J. Graham trans., 1982).
45. "[P]eace is the continuation of war by other means." Hannah Arendt, On Vi-
olence, in CRISES OF THE REPUBLIC 111 (1972). Arendt is describing the position of the
author of the Report from Iron Mountain, a pamphlet published in 1967, allegedly au-
thored by U.S. government officials but later determined to be the work of Leonard C.
Lewin, a freelance author. The Report considers the possibility of permanent peace and
concludes that peace is against the interests of the United States. A few years after the
publication of the Report and Arendt's essay On Violence, Michel Foucault taught a
course at the CollEge de France in which he sought to examine the hypothesis that "poli-
tics is the continuation of war by other means." See MICHEL FOUCAULT, "SOCIETY
MUST BE DEFENDED": LECTURES AT THE COLLtGE DE FRANCE, 1975-1976, at 15 (Da-
vid Macey trans., Mauro Bertani & Alessandro Fontana eds., 2003). Before either
Arendt's On Violence essay or Foucault's lectures, Carl Schmitt had considered Clause-
witz's claim in THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL (George Schwab trans., 1996).
46. As do many authors who invoke the phrase. For example, John Yoo has long
favored the "by other means" formulation in the titles to his work, but the works them-
selves do not explain his understanding of the phrase. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, WAR BY
OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006); John Yoo,
The Continuation of Politics By Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Pow-
ers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996). For a somewhat different use of the phrase that impli-
cates the broader questions of this essay, see Pierre Schlag, Law As the Continuation of
God By Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427 (1997).
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cludes punishment and policing from its conception of politics.
Similarly, a great deal of contemporary constitutional theory all
but ignores the provisions of the Constitution that address the
state's use of force against its own citizens.47 The Fourth, Fifth,
and Eighth Amendments have been excised from mainstream
constitutional law and are instead covered in separate criminal
procedure or criminal law courses. This outcome seems neces-
sary as a matter of pedagogical and textbook economy, but it
may have had unfortunate consequences for constitutional
theory. It may leave constitutional scholars blind to ordinary vi-
olence, to the fact that legal decisions put bodies on the line
every day.48
Of course, I do not mean to equate the use of force to police
and punish with the sorts of violence that the scholars label con-
stitutional crisis-the Civil War, or the deployment of federal
troops to enforce racial integration in public schools. The broad
category violence can encompass many different means. But the
distinctions between these events and "ordinary" politics turn on
much more than the presence or absence of brute force. And
when we think of the functions of the U.S. Constitution, we
should not count among its achievements the elimination of vi-
olence from politics. Indeed, as I argue elsewhere, the Constitu-
tion as currently interpreted provides little regulation of the use
of force.49 That claim is unsurprising to many scholars and teach-
ers of the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments, but it should
be emphasized in mainstream constitutional law scholarship as
well.
To return to the question of crisis: whether we think in
terms of doctrinal indeterminancy or institutional conflict, it
seems difficult to make the case that the United States is pre-
sently at a distinctive moment of constitutional crisis. If we are in
crisis now, we have been for a long time. If a crisis is simply a
turning point, a moment at which things could go in either of two
or more very different directions, then constitutional law is al-
ways in crisis. If a crisis is more than a mere turning point, but a
47. See Louis D. Bilionis, Conservative Reformation, Popularization, and the Les-
sons of Reading Criminal Justice as Constitutional Law, 52 UCLA L. REV. 979 (2005)
(describing, and criticizing, the tendency to segregate criminal justice cases from the rest
of constitutional law). Bilionis notes that Balkin and Levinson decried this segregation in
1998, only to continue it in their own work. See id. at 985 n.32.
48. Cf Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
49. Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1353 (2008).
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point at which continued survival is in real jeopardy, then Amer-
ican constitutional law is rarely if ever in crisis. Of course, one
could give an account of crisis that included some historical mo-
ments and not others if we focused on threats to survival-but
then the question would be how great the threat of collapse must
be for a conflict to count as a crisis. I suspect that present threats
to the American constitutional system are relatively slight, but I
will leave that discussion for the first section in Part II.
II. THREE FORMS OF ANXIETY
This much is clear: scholars of American constitutional
law-and many commentators beyond the academy-speak of
constitutional crisis. In the remainder of this Essay, I explore
possible reasons for the perception and discourse of crisis. Crisis
talk may stem from one or more forms of existential anxiety-
about personal or national survival, about constitutional law it-
self, or about the role of the constitutional law professor. To ex-
amine these anxieties (even the third) is not mere omphaloskep-
sis, I hope: it may help us treat the crisis or dispel the worries.
A. EXISTENTIAL THREATS AND SELF-PRESERVATION
Perhaps references to constitutional crisis reflect a deeper
existential crisis-namely, a sudden awareness of our own vulne-
rability, and a worry that life in the United States as we know it
may soon cease to exist. The attacks of September 11, 2001, and
the subsequent "war on terror" may be perceived as an existen-
tial threat to the nation as a whole and to each of its citizens. An
existential threat prompts talk of constitutional crisis not so
much because the Constitution dies if the nation does (though
that seems true), but because of a strongly held intuition that law
must yield to the necessities of self-preservation. If national sur-
vival is at stake, the Constitution means little.
The most familiar expression of this idea today is probably
the quip that the Constitution is not a suicide pact. ° It's a me-
morable quip, and a misleading one. The Constitution is not a
50. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A
TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006); cf Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 160 (1963) ("[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights,
it is not a suicide pact."); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) ("There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic
with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide
pact.").
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homicide pact, either. Unfortunately, the "suicide pact" line is
too often invoked to imply that Americans have only two choic-
es: they may insist on constitutional fidelity and thereby doom
themselves, or they must accept whatever course of action the
commander-in-chief chooses, however murderous it may be.
This binary should be questioned for several reasons: because
there is dubious empirical support for the claim that constitu-
tional fidelity now will lead to national destruction or great risks
thereof; because we are not always sure what counts as "consti-
tutional fidelity," anyway; because it is far from clear that total
deference to the executive is the best means of ensuring our own
survival; and perhaps most importantly, because we are crea-
tures who care not just about being preserved, but about pre-
serving ourselves. 1
At any rate, it seems unlikely that a sense of existential dan-
ger is the primary source of references to constitutional crisis to-
day. First, the intense fear that followed the September 11 at-
tacks has faded considerably. But more importantly, when they
are convinced that self-preservation is really at stake, jurists and
constitutional theorists tend to find ways to make law accommo-
date self-preservation. For this reason, we rarely if ever see a po-
litical leader announce that he must violate the Constitution to
save the nation-crises of fidelity are more or less nonexistent.52
So present references to crisis are probably not provoked by
the belief that the Constitution must be ignored in order to pre-
serve the nation. The more typical argument runs something like
this: A given defensive (or aggressive) measure is necessary to
survive, and fortunately, the Constitution permits it. Consider,
for example, Justice Scalia's dissent in Boumediene v. Bush.53
The rhetoric of existential threat is at full volume: "America is at
war... I think it appropriate to begin with a description of the
disastrous consequences of what the Court has done today.
54
The majority's extension of the right of habeas corpus to Guan-
tanamo detainees "will almost certainly cause more Americans
51. See Alice Ristroph, Professors Strangelove, 11 GREEN BAG 2d 245, 258-59
(2008).
52. See Whittington, supra note 4; Levinson & Balkin, supra note 4, at 721-23; id. at
724-25 ("American constitutional history after George Washington's inauguration has
produced no unequivocal examples of type one crises .... [O]ur tradition of constitu-
tional interpretation allows such flexibility in making constitutional arguments that no
President ever need admit that he or she is disobeying the Constitution.").
53. 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
54. Id. at 2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to be killed."55 On this account, denying those rights was neces-
sary as a matter of survival. But Scalia did not rest his argument
on a claim of necessity. Instead, he argued that the denial of ha-
beas rights was also required by existing constitutional doctrine:
some American deaths "would be tolerable if necessary to pre-
serve a time-honored legal principle vital to our constitutional
republic. But it is this Court's blatant abandonment of such a
principle that produces the decision today., 56 Scalia's account is
consistent with other defenses of controversial national security
policies. We rarely hear the argument that the administration
has violated the Constitution but was compelled by necessity to
do so. Instead, the claim is that the Constitution permits the ad-
ministration's measures. 57 Necessity does not supercede law; it
defines the scope of the president's legal authority. And, on this
account, the president himself determines what is necessary for
national survival. The upshot is that there's no such thing as an
unconstitutional president, and it's a good thing too.
58
A second notable decision from the October 2007 Term
suggests that for individuals as well as for the nation, law is more
likely to accommodate than be superceded by the needs of self-
preservation. I speak of District of Columbia v. Heller, the in-
stantly (in)famous decision identifying an individual right to bear
arms under the Second Amendment. So far, most academic
commentary on Heller has focused on its methodology-there is
no shortage of defenders or critics of Justice Scalia's originalism
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. For another illustration, consider the exchange between Justices Scalia and
Thomas in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). Both dissented from the plurality
holding that a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant must be given an opportunity to
challenge his detention. Scalia argued that the plurality did not go far enough; he rea-
soned that the government was required to file criminal charges against the detained citi-
zen or to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 542 U.S. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Tho-
mas worried that if charging or suspension were really the only two options permitted by
the Constitution, a crisis of operation could arise: Congress may "have to choose be-
tween acting unconstitutionally and depriving the President of the tools he needs to pro-
tect the Nation." 542 U.S. at 594 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thomas concluded that the
Constitution must permit other options beyond suspending the writ and charging the de-
tainee. To this, Scalia replied that whenever security was so greatly threatened that inde-
finite detention was necessary, the conditions for the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus would be met. 542 U.S. at 578 n.6 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Though they disagreed
about what necessity required in this particular case, both Justices agreed that whatever
necessity demanded, the constitution would permit.
58. This argument may be understood as a narrower version of Richard Nixon's
infamous claim that "[w]hen the President does it, that means that it is not illegal." The
narrower claim is that when the president acts on his good-faith determinations of na-
tional necessity, his actions are never unconstitutional.
59. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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in the majority opinion. More interesting than the interpretive
methodology, in my view, is this substantive implication of the
majority opinion: it appears to constitutionalize a right of per-
sonal self-preservation. Before Heller, the Supreme Court had
never held that the Constitution required states to recognize a
right of self-defense. 60 But according to the Heller majority, self-
defense is no mere "subsidiary interest" of the Second Amend-
ment right to keep and bear arms, but "the central component of
the right itself.",61 The Second Amendment codified a preexisting
"inherent right" to self-defense. 62 And though Justice Scalia does
not explain in detail the source of this "inherent right," others
have suggested that any system of law must acknowledge the ba-
sic human desire for self-preservation and accommodate a right
of self-defense.63
In my view, self more than defense is the critical term. What
is fascinating about the Heller majority opinion- and what made
its arrival in 2008, when American leaders still referred to the
"war on terror," so intriguing-is its unrelenting insistence on a
right of self-defense as opposed to a mere entitlement to be de-
fended. There is a difference, recognized in the majority opinion,
between preserving oneself and being preserved by someone
else. Heller insists that individuals have a right to be agents of
their own preservation; it is not sufficient for the state to promise
an effective constabulary or military. (Indeed, the historical ma-
terials discussed in Heller seem to raise the possibility that the
constabulary or military will create the threat against which the
individual needs arms to defend himself.) So, while Heller was
60. But a four-Justice plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia had raised the
possibility that the right to self-defense may be "fundamental." Montana v. Egelhoff, 518
U.S. 37, 56 (1996).
61. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2801 (emphasis in original).
62. Id. at 2817.
63. "In one sense, the right of self-defense is beyond the law. A legal system which
failed to recognize the right ... could have no valid claim on the allegiance or obedience
of those it sought to bring within its sway. But in recognizing the right, the law brings
self-defense within its ambit; while it may not deny the right, it may and must, of course,
delimit it." David Gauthier, Self-Defense and the Requirement of Imminence, 57 U. PiTr.
L. REV. 615, 616 (1996). One could interpret the claim that the law must recognize self-
defense as the individualist version of the claim that the Constitution (or the social con-
tract) is not a suicide pact. Thomas Hobbes offers one of the most sophisticated-and
uncompromising-defenses of a pre-legal, pre-political individual right to self-
preservation. As I show elsewhere, the commitment to a right of self-preservation has
surprising implications in Hobbes-most notably, a right to resist even legitimate, autho-
rized punishment. See Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97
CAL. L. REV. 601 (2009).
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surely not written to appease civil libertarian critics of the war
on terror, the opinion nevertheless offers a libertarian alterna-
tive to the suggestion that when faced with threats to personal
security, individuals must sit back and let their leaders decide
how to defend them.
There are important distinctions, of course, between exis-
tential threats to nations that warrant defensive actions by politi-
cal leaders and threats of harm or death to individuals that war-
rant the use of force in self-defense. Even if law must
accommodate a right to individual self-defense, it does appear to
regulate that right in meaningful ways-by requiring that threats
be imminent, for example, or by permitting deadly force only in
response to deadly threats.64 That is, the law's prohibition of pri-
vate violence does yield to necessity, but the law itself also offers
a framework to evaluate individuals' claims of alleged necessity.
It is difficult for law to regulate a nation's use of force in the
same way. We can ask a jury to determine whether an individual
had a reasonable belief that her life was in danger, but it's not
clear who we should ask to evaluate whether a government had
a reasonable belief that the nation's survival was at stake.65 This
difference, between regulating individual persons and regulating
governments, leads to a second form of existential anxiety.
When law must yield to official claims of necessity and has no
way to cabin or evaluate those claims, we have reason to doubt
about the ability of law to regulate governments. Those doubts
produce in turn doubts about the relevance of constitutional law
itself.
B. RESISTING THRASYMACHUS
One reason to care whether law is in "crisis" concerns our
own expectations of the function of law. A possible achievement
is to offer an alternative to violence-as we saw in Levinson and
Balkin's account of the Constitution as enabling nonviolent dis-
pute resolution. 66 This might be called the anti-Thrasymachus
view of law. Early in Plato's Republic (before Socrates has
tamed him), a young man called Thrasymachus describes justice
as "the advantage of the stronger., 67 The claim is that might
64. See Gauthier, supra note 63; Ristroph, supra note 63.
65. For an illuminating examination of "self-defense" arguments by nations in the
context of self-defense doctrine, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence:
From Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIz. L. REv. 216 (2004).
66. See Levinson & Balkin, supra note 4, at 714-15, 721.
67. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 338c (R.E. Allen trans., 2006); cf. THUCYDIDES, THE
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makes right, and Western political and legal thought has pro-
duced many efforts to prove Thrasymachus and his heirs wrong.
If law distinguishes right from might, then it becomes important
to say what law is, and to show that it exists. Hence, many ongo-
ing jurisprudential debates about the criteria for a valid and
functional system of law (including worries about legal indeter-
minancy) are motivated by worries about arbitrary power and
violence. 68 To show Thrasymachus to be mistaken, we want to
show that the rule of law is really different from the rule of (the
strongest) men.
In legal theory, we could view John Austin's positivism-
law as commands backed by threats of punishment--as a des-
cendant of Thrasymachus's claim.69 Here, I want to examine
briefly one of the most influential, and most plausible, efforts to
show that law is something more and different from the com-
mands of a gunman: H. L. A. Hart's response to Austin. Hart
framed his discussion around the question, "What is law?".7 ° But
perhaps, as the Stoppard passage that opened this essay suggests,
beginning with this question led us to conjure an image of law
with various predicates that do not, as it turns out, include exis-
tence. A second form of existential anxiety, one that I suspect
shapes present talk of crisis, is the anxiety that Thrasymachus
and Austin were right and law, if it is anything more than com-
mand and force, does not exist.
For my purposes here, the critical features of Hart's account
are the rule of recognition and the internal point of view. Since,
in most of The Concept of Law, Hart takes law's existence for
granted, it is helpful to look at the passages where law's exis-
tence, or at least the existence of a particular form of law, is up
for grabs. In his classic discussion of the question, "Is interna-
tional law really law?", H. L. A. Hart deployed the concepts of a
rule of recognition and the internal point of view to conclude
that international law was at most in a state of transition toward
fully legal law, moving toward law properly so called but certain-
ly not yet there. 71 At the time he wrote The Concept of Law,
PELOPONNESIAN WAR 351 (Richard Crawley trans., 1982) ("[T]he strong do what they
can and the weak suffer what they must.").
68. See Nicola Lacey, Philosophy, Political Morality, and History: Explaining the
Enduring Resonance of the Hart-Fuller Debate, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1072-78 (2008).
69. Austin claimed that sanctions were "the key to the science of jurisprudence."
JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 13 (1954).
70. HART, supra note 2, at 1.
71. Id. at 230-31.
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Hart believed that international law departed from domestic (or
"municipal") law in that it lacked a widely accepted rule of rec-
ognition and in that states could not be said to take the internal
point of view toward international obligations. (Hart's argument
has been challenged by many contemporary scholars of interna-
tional law, but that particular dispute need not occupy us here.72)
For law qua law to exist, Hart argued, there must be a rule of
recognition under which the authoritative status of other rules
was accepted or denied, and the officials who would apply the
rule of recognition must themselves take the internal point of
view toward it. That is, the officials needed to view the rule of
recognition as a binding, authoritative guide to their own deci-
sions.
Suppose Hart was right and the rule of recognition and the
internal point of view are conditions for the existence of law.
Two questions arise: what is the rule of recognition for constitu-
tional law, and who must hold the internal standpoint toward
that rule? The Constitution itself initially seems a candidate for
the rule of recognition, though the fact that the Constitution
must itself be interpreted leads some theorists to amend this ac-
count and say that the rule of recognition must include authori-
tative statements of the meaning of the Constitution, under pre-
vailing interpretive standards.73 As for the internal point of view,
we might hope that all state officials would take this point of
view toward constitutional rules.7 4 In other words, we might
hope that every state actor would comply with the U.S. Constitu-
tion because it is the Constitution, not simply to avoid injunc-
tions, or judicial invalidation of legislative action, or liability un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But Hart's theory does not demand
universal adherence to an internal point of view. Even if legisla-
tors and other public officials complied with First or Fourth or
72. For example, Harold Koh has argued that transnational actors do actually take
the internal point of view toward international law. Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Na-
tions Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2659 (1997).
73. See Matthew D. Adler & Michael C. Dorf, Constitutional Existence Conditions
and Judicial Review, 89 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1129-33 (2003) (describing the U.S. Constitu-
tion as setting forth the conditions under which enactments will count as law, and thus as
analogous to a Hartian rule of recognition); Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition
and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV. 621, 659-60 (1987). See also THE RULE OF
RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (Adler & Himma eds., forth-
coming 2009).
74. To use Matthew Adler's phrase, the question is the identity of the "recognition-
al community." Matthew Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition:
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 719, 726 (2006). As Adler notes,
answers to the question "who must hold the internal point of view vis-A-vis the rule of
recognition" vary from "all judges," to "all officials," to "all citizens."
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Fourteenth Amendment doctrine only to avoid invalidation or
§ 1983 liability-even if these public officials were the equivalent
of Holmes's bad man-Hart might find that constitutional law
still existed in a meaningful sense so long as the judges applying
constitutional rules believed themselves to be bound by a consti-
tutional rule of recognition.7"
Here is a possibility, one I believe we must take seriously
and one that prompts anxiety about the existence of constitu-
tional law itself: there is no common rule of recognition toward
which judges and other officials take an internal point of view.76
Individual judges may adhere to their particular understandings
of the rule of recognition-the Constitution as interpreted by
proper originalist methods, for example, or the Constitution as
elucidated by popular understandings. But the fact that individ-
ual state actors follow their own rules of recognition in good
faith does not satisfy Hart's account of law, and it does not pro-
vide a satisfying alternative to Thrasymachus. (There is no rea-
son, on the might-makes-right account, that the mighty cannot
hold the good faith belief that they are pursuing a common good
or acting pursuant to rule-governed authority. What matters is
that their power is in fact traceable to their superior strength.)
There is reason for academic observers to doubt the exis-
tence of a single rule of recognition in American constitutional
law. There are too many core interpretive disputes, as discussed
in Part I, and it is now widely accepted that constitutional rules
are at least underdeterminate. Should there be doubt about this
claim, consider this feature of constitutional law textbooks: they
include majority and dissenting opinions, and questions after
each case frequently ask the reader which opinion was more per-
suasive. Those questions are not posed as rhetorical. For most
constitutional decisions, we can say, it could have been other-
wise. With a few votes switched, with a different line-up of Jus-
tices, the same precedents (and in some cases, the same interpre-
tive methodology) could have produced a different outcome.
Moreover, these suspicions of indeterminancy or underdetermi-
75. How we interpret Hart depends in part on whether we focus on the original text
of The Concept of Law or the Postscript. See id. at 731-32 (discussing the competing in-
terpretations of Hart).
76. Adler argues that U.S. constitutional law operates with multiple rules of recog-
nition. See id. at 746. Jeremy Waldron goes further, suggesting that constitutional law
doesn't need a rule of recognition at all. See Jeremy Waldron, Who Needs Rules of Rec-
ognition? (NYU Sch. of Law, Pub. Law Research Paper No. 09-21, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1358477.
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nancy are not the unique province of the academy. Think of the
discussions of Supreme Court appointments in presidential elec-
tions. Many voters, law professors or not, understand their vote
for president to be also a vote for a certain kind of Justice and
for certain kinds of constitutional outcomes. Discussions of Su-
preme Court appointments are often framed in terms of judicial
methodology-"I will appoint judges who are faithful to the text
of the Constitution" - but that language may be more a matter
of decorum than of real constitutional faith.
Judges, of course, are not ignorant of the charges of inde-
terminancy or of the politicization of judicial appointments. And
it seems possible that the erosion of constitutional faith has
reached the judiciary itself.77 I claim no special insight into judi-
cial psychology, but it seems implausible that the reasons for
constitutional skepticism-the discussions of underdetermined
rules, the contingency of outcomes based on 5-4 votes, and the
great attention to swing justices such as Sandra Day O'Connor
or Anthony Kennedy-have not influenced judges themselves.
Here again it seems worthwhile to consider dissenting opinions.
Justice Scalia's polemics come to mind immediately; he has often
accused his colleagues of acting lawlessly.78 Yet he keeps his post
and continues to participate in a system that treats as law the de-
terminations of five (potentially lawless) Justices. It is possible, I
suppose, that Justice Scalia's dissents express earnest outrage,
that he is shocked (shocked) by decisions like Lawrence v. Tex-
as79 and Boumediene. It is possible that he believes himself to be
the last best hope of constitutional law properly so called. But it
seems more likely that he shares the skepticism of academic ob-
servers of the Court.
Though one can't help but wonder whether judges are still
constitutionally devout, I should emphasize here that my argu-
ment does not turn on a claim that judges are acting in good or
bad faith. Individual judges may well take the internal point of
view, in Hart's terms, and strive faithfully to apply the principles
they recognize as law. But it seems clear that American judges
do not all hold the internal point of view toward a single, shared
rule of recognition, given the nature of disagreements among
judges themselves. If there are multiple rules of recognition, va-
rying from judge to judge, then legal outcomes will depend on
77. See RICHARD POSNER, How JUDGES THINK (2008).
78. One example is his Boumediene dissent discussed above.
79. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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which judge is empowered to make the critical decision, and
Thrasymachus is not so far off the mark.
Contemporary judicial disagreement is profound, and it is
not just a matter of Justice Scalia's flair for colorful rhetoric.
Consider Scott v. Harris, the recent decision granting summary
judgment (on the basis of qualified immunity) to a police officer
who had rammed a passenger car during a high-speed chase,
causing an accident that left the driver a quadriplegic.8" Like
most use-of-force opinions, the decision applies a deferential
Fourth Amendment standard that gives police officers wide lee-
way. What is unusual about Harris is that, because the case arose
as a civil suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the critical question
(whether the driver, Victor Harris, posed a sufficient threat to
others' bodily safety such that the use of deadly force was rea-
sonable) was nominally a jury question, and at summary judg-
ment, the court should have taken the facts in the light most fa-
vorable to the non-moving party-the injured driver. Thus, in
earlier use-of-force cases that reached the Court as § 1983
claims, the Court articulated the Fourth Amendment standard
and then remanded the case to the trial court.8' But in Harris,
the Court had access to videotapes of the chase recorded by
cameras on the dashboards of the police vehicles involved. In
the view of the eight-Justice majority, the videotape "spoke for
itself": it made Harris's threat to the public so clear that no rea-
sonable juror could conclude that the officer's use of force was
unreasonable. 83 Accordingly, the Supreme Court found the of-
ficer to be entitled to summary judgment.84
Doubtless there are many instances in which a court grants
summary judgment to one party though non-judicial observers
believe a reasonable juror could find for the other party. Harris
is of particular interest, though, because the "reasonable juror"
who might have found in favor of Victor Harris was clearly visi-
ble to the majority-in fact, this juror had a spokesman on the
Court. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter in Scott v. Harris,
viewed the same videotape and found it to confirm the factual
findings of the district court (which had denied the police offic-
80. 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007).
81. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397-98 (1989).
82. Harris, 127 S. Ct. at 1775.
83. Id. at 1775 n.5.
84. Id. at 1779.
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er's motion for summary judgment).8" Though Justice Stevens
was careful not to base his argument on an actual determination
of the substantive Fourth Amendment question (chiding his col-
leagues for doing just that and thereby acting as "jurors" rather
than judges),86 he viewed the video evidence and explained how
one might conclude, perfectly reasonably, that Scott had used
excessive force.87 In order for the eight Justices in the Harris ma-
jority to believe their own opinion, they would have to conclude
that Justice Stevens lived outside the realm of reason.
Harris is nominally a dispute about what reasonable jurors
could conclude, rather than a direct argument about the meaning
of a particular constitutional provision. But the two reactions to
the videotape should call to mind Larry Tribe's worry that
American constitutional law is plagued by "deep and thus far in-
tractable divisions between wholly different ways of assessing
truth and experiencing reality., 88 It is not just abortion and as-
sisted suicide that reveal profound disagreement about what is
true and real. A videotape that "speaks for itself" in the eyes of
eight Justices says something entirely different to the ninth.
Looking beyond the judiciary, consider the consequences of
constitutional disagreement and constitutional indeterminancy
for other government officials and for would-be critics of those
officials. Earlier I noted that with sufficient constitutional inde-
terminancy, there's no such thing as an unconstitutional presi-
dent. A more extreme version of this argument is that with suffi-
cient legal indeterminancy, there's no such thing as illegality.
When John Yoo wrote the Office of Legal Counsel memos that
defend practices formerly known as torture, he was simply doing
to bans on torture what critics had long argued it was possible to
do for any law: he was trashing them. 9 This was the spawn of
CLS put to work in the OLC; deconstructions on the left are
now deconstructions on the right.90
85. Id. at 1781-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1781 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Elight of the jurors on this Court reach a
verdict that differs from the views of the [lower court judges]."); see also id. at 1782 ("my
colleagues on the jury saw..
87. Id. at 1781-83.
88. Tribe, supra note 3, at 302.
89. Cf. Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).
90. Cf. Dorf, supra note 9, at 1247 ("[T]he association of skepticism with the politi-
cal left lasted only so long as courts were more conservative than legislatures. When the
Warren Court invoked abstract constitutional language in support of racial equality, the
rights of criminal suspects, and sexual freedom, the left and right switched positions.").
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And that, of course, is cause for anxiety among those who
would like to argue that George W. Bush or members of his ad-
ministration acted illegally. As I suggested in the Introduction,
this may be the Pyrrhic victory of critical legal studies: If the crits
were correct, then there is no distinctively legal form of critique.
About torture, indefinite detention, warrantless wiretapping,
and so on, we can say I don't like it or it doesn't correspond to my
vision of the good, but we cannot say it's illegal. To argue that
the Bush administration violated the rule of law, we need to be-
lieve that the rule of law exists. But for 30 years or more, we
have found reasons to doubt that it does.91
Perhaps it will seem that I am overstating the influence of
legal realism and critical legal studies, or the doubts about law's
existence. I'm willing to entertain those possibilities, but I do
want to emphasize that the focus is on constitutional law. It's
easy enough to believe in law when we see it applied and en-
forced by figures of authority in a recognized hierarchy. That is,
the sentencing judge or the prison warden can believe in law-he
has applied it himself. And the criminal should believe in law-
he has felt its force. But these examples illustrate Austinian law:
commands backed by force. What remains elusive, on my ac-
count, are laws that are truly laws given to oneself, and especial-
ly law given by a state to itself.92 That is why, in Part I of this es-
say, I suggested that brute force is a poor candidate to
distinguish ordinary politics, or ordinary legal decisions, from ex-
traordinary moments of crisis. What would be truly extraordi-
nary is not the use of force, but its absence: a system of law truly
based on consent and independent of sanction.
91. Others have made similar observations about the consequences of deeply criti-
cal legal scholarship. Roscoe Pound warned that legal realism would threaten Progressive
reform efforts by undoing law itself. Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence,
44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931). Twenty-five years ago, Paul Carrington warned of the
dangers of "legal nihilism" and suggested that nihilists had no place in the academy. See
Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 222 (1984). Much more
recently, Mike Seidman has claimed that events in the United States after September 11
"provide a stunning confirmation of the claims critical constitutionalists made during the
last century," and yet the critics find it difficult to develop a legal critique of the Bush
administration. Louis Michael Seidman, Critical Constitutionalism Now, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 575, 583-84 (2006).
92. Jack Goldsmith and Daryl Levinson offer a similar descriptive account of the
difficulty of regulating states through law. See Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for
States: International Law, Constitutional Law, Public Law, 122 HARv. L. REV. 1791
(2009).
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The Constitution, in theory, is a law given unto oneself. By
this I mean not simply that the Founders gave the Constitution
to future generations, but that each successive generation must
give the Constitution to itself: each generation must adopt the
internal point of view toward the Constitution in order for it to
be effective. Even once we have accepted the written text as au-
thoritative, all but the strictest constructionists acknowledge that
many meanings can plausibly be extracted from that text. (And
even the strict constructionists must acknowledge that as a fac-
tual matter many meanings have been extracted; they deny only
the plausibility of those varied readings.) Any law given unto
oneself requires what Hart called the internal point of view, and
what one more cynical might describe as self-delusion: it requires
a belief that one is bound though one could at any minute walk
away. It is possible, I think, that we have outwitted the Consti-
tution: that we have become too clever, too quick to notice in-
determinancy, even too post-modern to believe ourselves
bound.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHAT IS IT GOOD FOR?
A third possible explanation for contemporary references to
crisis is professional malaise. It could be, as I suggested earlier,
that after too many years of chewing what judges had for break-
fast, professors have lost their appetites. It could be that the
problems of originalists and historicists and popular constitutio-
nalists don't amount to a hill of beans in this crazy world. And if
these possibilities have not crossed the law professor's mind,
they probably should.
We might consider again Larry Tribe's explanation of his
decision to stop work on his treatise of American constitutional
law. There are two questions of meaning there, one of which
Tribe confronts directly and the other which he brushes off
quickly. Most obviously, there is the search for constitutional
meaning, as Tribe acknowledges, a search that cannot be con-
cluded within the Constitution's own text. "I see no escape from
adopting some perspective.., external to the constitution itself
from which to decide questions not indisputably resolved one
way or the other by the text and structure .... " 9 Tribe goes on
to wonder where these extra-constitutional criteria come from,
and "who ratified the meta-constitution that such external crite-
93. Tribe, supra note 3, at 304-05.
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ria would comprise?".94 Supreme Court Justices (and other
judges) must struggle with these questions, given "the public au-
thority that they have the enormous responsibility and privilege
to wield., 95 But Tribe need not. He can simply decline to finish
the treatise.
If he declines to finish the treatise, though, we can't help
asking ourselves what was at stake, and what remains at stake. If
the law professor lacks the responsibility of a judge, is his consti-
tutional theory just an amusing hobby? What was the point of
the constitutional law treatise, or of other efforts to discern co-
herent principles of constitutional law? The significance of a
treatise is the question of meaning that Tribe brushes off quick-
ly: he says a treatise is an "attempt at a synthesis of some endur-
ing value" and insists that his decision is not based on doubts
about whether constitutional treatises are ever worthwhile. 96 But
Tribe's letter leaves the "enduring value" of a treatise rather un-
derspecified, and it is possible that current references to consti-
tutional crisis in the academy stem from uncertainty about such
questions of value.
Is constitutional theory good for absolutely nothing? Only if
we believe that the effort to resist Thrasymachus is futile or
pointless. Constitutional theory is a species of legal and political
theory, and the most intriguing forms of such theory are pro-
duced by worries that law and violence are too closely intert-
wined. 97 Thus I suggested at the outset of this essay that existen-
tial anxiety is not always to be regretted, cured, or mocked. Such
anxiety may be an important indication that we have noticed the
ways in which Thrasymachus seems right, and we still care
enough to try to prove him wrong.98
94. Id. at 305.
95. Id.; see also POSNER, supra note 77, at 79-80 (describing "the imperative duty of
judges to decide").
96. Tribe, supra note 3, at 295.
97. In response to Pierre Schlag's latest indictment of legal scholarship, two com-
mentators note that the enterprise is meaningless only if we are indifferent to arguments
about justice, or the claims of moral and political theory. See Richard H. Weisberg, Da-
niel Arises: Notes (Such as 30 and 31) from the Schlagaground, 97 GEO. L.J. 857, 861-64
(2009); Robin West, A Reply to Pierre, 97 GEO. L.J. 865, 874-75 (2009).
98. In other words, existential anxiety seems preferable to existential nihilism. The
contrast is clear in Camus's "Letters to A German Friend," in which he explains that his
recognition of the absence of ultimate meaning led him not to nihilistic violence but ra-
ther to the pursuit of justice and human solidarity:
For a long time we both thought that this world had no ultimate meaning....
You supposed that in the absence of any human or divine code the only values
were those of the animal world-in other words, violence and cunning....
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CONCLUSION
After so much talk of crisis and anxiety, consider an illustra-
tion from the dramatic genre. Tom Stoppard's play Jumpers fea-
tures a troupe of philosophy professors who double as acrobats:
"Logical positivists, mainly, with a linguistic analyst or two, a
couple of Benthamite utilitarians... lapsed Kantians and empi-
ricists generally... and of course the usual Behaviorists.. . a
mixture of the more philosophical members of the university
gymnastics team and the more gymnastic members of the Phi-
losophy School." 99 The Jumpers seem to practice what we would
now identify as post-modern nihilism: One shoots and kills
another, then conceals the murder with cheerful aplomb.
Against these intellectually and physically adroit colleagues, the
clumsy and old-fashioned Professor George Moore struggles to
defend "the irreducible fact of goodness,"' 00 the possibility of a
"moral conscience," and the claim that "there is more in me than
meets the microscope." '10' "Is God?" Moore wonders. He can
neither shake nor defend his faith.
Law schools, I think, are filled with moral sympathizers to
Professor Moore who possess the skills of modern-day Jum-
pers.10 2 The current discourse of crisis is the latest manifestation
of an old struggle between faith and doubt, and it is not one that
we will resolve. On one hand, we have observed too much to
believe (in law) unquestioningly. And on the other hand, we
are determined to have law, even if we must make it our-
selves. There was at least a smidgen of truth in John Finnis's
claim that scholars of critical legal studies were "disap-
pointed ... absolutists."'' 3 But it is not just crits that are dis-
appointed when they look for law and see nothing. Few scho-
lars of any stripe want to vindicate Thrasymachus. All of this
is just to reiterate the difficulty, and perhaps the necessity, of
Where lay the difference? Simply that you readily accepted despair and I never
yielded to it. Simply that you saw the injustice of our condition to the point of
being willing to add to it, whereas it seemed to me that man must exalt justice in
order to fight against eternal injustice .... I merely wanted men to rediscover
their solidarity in order to wage war against their revolting fate.
Albert Camus, Letters to A German Friend: Fourth Letter, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION,
AND DEATH, 27-28 (Justin O'Brien trans., Vintage Books 1974).
99. STOPPARD, supra note 1, at 50-51.
100. Id. at 55.
101. Id. at 67.
102. Here again, Pierre Schlag has diagnosed at least the first half of this condition.
Schlag, supra note 46. Schlag displays little empathy for those who yearn for God, or law.
103. See J. M. Finnis, On "The Critical Legal Studies Movement", 30 AM. J. JURIS.
21, 37 (1985).
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giving a law unto oneself. If constitutional law did not exist, it
would be necessary to invent it.

